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DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
III. CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
AND HABEAS CORPUS
During 1964 the Colorado Supreme Court decided over fifty
cases dealing with criminal law, criminal procedure, and habeas
corpus. No attempt is made herein to discuss each case; only those
cases deemed significant warranted comment.
A. ACTS DONE SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMMISSION OF HOMICIDE
NOT ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
In a 1964 homicide case, Stafford v. People, where deceased
was killed by a blow from defendant's fist, it was held that the facts
that defendant buried the body, repeatedly lied concerning the dis-
appearance of the victim, went under an assumed name, and escaped
from jail while awaiting trial were properly introduced as evidence
of guilt but could not supply the missing element of malice.' It has
been held a number of times in Colorado that a blow with the fist
or open hand is not calculated to cause death, and malice or intent
to kill cannot generally be implied because death resulted from the
blow?
The more difficult question for the court was whether malice
could be implied from the acts of the accused subsequent to the kill-
ing. The court answered in the negative, relying on two North
Carolina cases3 which, in part, said flight and other acts showing
guilt subsequent to the homicide were not proper as evidence of
premeditation and deliberation.
There is a division of authority as to the propriety of allowing
the jury to consider subsequent conduct as bearing on the issue of
malice and premeditation. Most states seem to be in agreement that
such evidence, in conjunction with the other circumstances of the
crime, is admissible to show only state of mind and consciousness
of guilt at the time of flight.' However, some jurisdictions allow
1388 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1964).
2 McAndrews v. People, 71 Colo. 542, 208 Pac. 486 (1922); Murphy v. People, 9
Colo. 435, 13 Pac. 528 (1887). See, Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 854 (1952) as to the
inferdence of malice or intent to kill where killing is by blow without a weapon.
3 State v. Steele, 190 N.C. 506, 130 S.E. 308 '(1925) ; State v. Foster, 130 N.C. 666,
41 S.E. 384 (1902). See a more recent case holding the same but not cited in the
Stafford opinion, State v. Blanks, 230 N.C. 501, 53 S.E.2d 452 (1949).
4 E.g., Green v. U.S., 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; State v. Golden, 67 Idaho 497,
186 P.2d 485 (1947) ; State v. Nelson, 65 N.M. 403, 338 P.2d 301 (1959) ; State
v. Ross, 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77 (1952); see generally 2 WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE § 276 (3rd ed. 1940). It is interesting to note that Colorado is one of
the few jurisdictions where such evidence is not expressly permissible to prove the
crime, but can only be used in corroboration of other evidence to show a guilty
conscience. Bernard v. People, 124 Colo. 424, 238 P.2d 852 (1951); Kostal v.
People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d 70 (1960) (Bernard v. People, supra, is cited with
approval, but the court states the rule as being that such evidence is admissible as
having a slight tendency to prove guilt).
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such evidence to be used in determining malice, premeditation and
deliberation.5 Colorado, by the Stafford decision, is not in accord
with this latter view.
B. FORMER JEOPARDY - MISTRIAL PROPER IN CASE TRIED BEFORE
COURT WITHOUT A JURY
Colorado has, since 1958, held that jeopardy attaches in the
prosecution of a criminal case which is tried to the court without a
jury at that moment when the judge begins to hear the evidence.6
In 1964 the Colorado Supreme Court held that there was no abuse
of discretion by the trial court in granting a mistrial in a murder
case tried without a jury when a state's witness, the defendant's
husband, was stricken and died while testifying. The defendant was
visibly disturbed, and the court, in granting a mistrial, acted within
the bounds of its discretionary power.7 Such declaration by the
trial court precluded defendant from successfully pleading former
jeopardy. The issue before the supreme court was whether there
was legal justification to warrant the mistrial. The court relied upon
language expressed in an earlier Colorado case tried before a jury,
Brown v. People," to substantiate its position. Essentially, a mistrial
5\Wahl v. State, 229 Ind. 521, 98 N.E.2d 671 (1951): "The jury had the right to
consider all of the circumstances bearing upon the question of premeditated malice,
regardless of whether the circumstances occurred before or after the homicide .. "
State v. Staley, 56 S.D. 495, 229 N.W. 373 (1930): "If accused's conduct subse-
quent to the homicide is directly connected with and tends to prove a preconceived
plan and its continued execution in which the homicide is but one of several acts
planned it may then be shown to characterize the homicidal act as unlawful and a
part of a premeditated criminal plan .. " Franks v. State, 187 Tenn. 174, 213
S.W.2d 105 (1948): "Any effort to conceal the crime on the part of the slayer is
admissible as showing premeditation .. " Jones v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. App. 345,
220 S.W.2d 156 (1949): Acts of the accused immediately subsequent to the homi-
cide admissible as showing malice. In State v. Bowser, 214 N.C. 249, 199 S.E. 31
(1938), the jury, in determining the question of premeditation and deliberation,
could properly consider the accused's conduct after the homicide. The case seems
contrary to the North Carolina position as expressed in prior and subsequent deci-
sions, but the holding could be explained as pertaining only to conduct immediately
following the death. The opinion gives no explanation of the apparent disparity.
6 Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 138, 330 P.2d 539 (1958) (In a case submitted
to the court without a jury, jeopardy begins after accused has been indicted, arraigned,
has pleaded and the court has begun to hear the evidence).
7 McCoy v. District Court, 397 P.2d 733 (Colo. 1964).
8 132 Colo. 561, 291 P.2d 680 (1955), which said that:
To be legally justified there must be a reasonable objective sought and a sub-
stantial purpose attained. The granting of a mistrial would not be legally
justified because of some whimsical notion or frivolous impulse, such as for
instance, that some members of the jury dyed his hair or wore an artificial
limb. While the cause for the order must be substantial and real, it need
not be vital. It need only be such as could affect, or might in some way or
manner be considered as interfering with, retarding, or influencing, to even
a slight degree, the administration of honest, fair, even-handed justice to either,
both, or any, of the parties to the proceeding... 132 Colo, at 561, 568-69.
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is proper if there is a "reasonable objective sought" and a "substantial
purpose attained."' In the instant case, the court felt the fair admin-
istration of justice was an objective necessitating a mistrial and that
the cause for the order was "substantial and real.''
There is no express authority in Colorado warranting a mistrial
when the court is acting as the trier of facts. Justice Frantz, strongly
dissenting in this case, declared the majority holding contrary to all
known authority and to the Colorado Constitution, Article 2, Sec-
tion 18, which provides: " . . nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. If the jury disagree, or if the judg-
ment be arrested after the verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for
error in law the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeop-
ardy."" The above excerpt from the Colorado Bill of Rights includes
no language that could be interpreted as authority for holding that
a mistrial granted in a case before a court without a jury precludes
accused from claiming former jeopardy. Justice Frantz states:
... Indeed, mistrial and discharge of a jury are interchangeable
judicial acts. I can conceive of no matter arising in the course of a
trial to a court which would warrant that court to declare a mis-
trial. 12
Mistrials will bar the defense of former jeopardy when the
case is tried before a jury," but there is apparently no authority in
other jurisdictions for granting a mistrial when the case comes before
the court presiding without a jury. 4 A proper course of action for
the trial court would have been to continue the case for a reasonable
period of time. The Supreme Court of Colorado clearly acted con-
trarily to the universally accepted view restricting mistrials to jury
cases in affirming the lower court's procedure.
9 Id. at 568.
1° McCoy v. District Court, 397 P.2d 733, 735 (Colo. 1964).
1 Id. at 736.
12 Ibid.
13 Brown v. People, 132 Colo. 561, 567, 291 P.2d 680, 684 (1955).
14 E.g., Fisk v. Henarie, 32 Fed. 417, 427 (9th Cir. 1887), "Where a jury is dis-
charged without a verdict, the proceeding is properly known as a mistrial .. "
State v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309 (1946); Curley v. Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp., 314 Mass. 31, 49 N.E.2d 445, 446 (1943), which held that, "A
mistrial is declared because of some circumstances indicating that justice may not
be done if the trial continues, and it results only in the discharge of the jury and
the impanelling of another jury to try the case anew .. "; Clark v. State, 170 Tenn.
484, 97 S.W.2d 644, 646 (1936), wherein the court stated that, "The term 'mistrial'
is aptly applied to a case in which a jury is discharged without a verdict. ' See
generally, 27 WORDS AND PHRASES, Mistrial 620 (Perm. ed. 1961).
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C. TRIAL COURT PROPER FORUM TO REQUEST ATTORNEYS' FEES
FOR PROSECUTING A WRIT OF ERROR ON BEHALF OF AN
INDIGENT
In Corbett v. People, "5 the supreme court held that the trial
court was the proper forum in which to request attorneys' fees and
out-of-pocket expenditures for prosecuting a writ of error on behalf
of an indigent criminal defendant.
This was the first time that such a request had been made in
the trial court. To substantiate its position, the high court relied
upon an analogous principle which says the trial court is the proper
forum in which an indigent would request aid of counsel to sue out
a writ of error.
D. (1) PLEA OF GUILTY CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN AFTER THE
SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED.
(2) IT IS PROPER FOR THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO EXPLAIN
TO ACCUSED CONSEQUENCES OF A PLEA OF GUILTY.
Pursuant to Rules 32(e) and 37(d) of the Colorado Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the supreme court held that a motion to with-
draw a plea of guilty to the crime of taking indecent liberties with
the person of a child, made after the sentence was imposed, was
properly denied.' Rule 32(e) provides: "A motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before
sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended." Rule
37(d) states: "No writ of error on behalf of the defendant shall
lie to a judgment based upon a plea of guilty or nolo contedere,
... " Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
the counterpart of Rule 32(e). The court, at the time of promul-
gating the Colorado rules, purposely deleted that portion of Rule
32(d) which says: ". . . but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defendant to withdraw his plea."
Justice Moore, writing for the court in 1964, stated:
Omission of the last quoted clause from Rule 32(e) of the Colo-
rado Rules of Criminal Procedure was not an oversight on the
part of this court. The committee of lawyers who served in prepara-
tion of the original draft of proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure
included the language above quoted from Federal Rule 32(d).
This court purposely deleted it from the rule to be followed in this
jurisdiction. 18
15 389 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1964).
61n re Pigg's Petition, 384 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1963); In re Griffin's Petition, 382
P.2d 202 (Colo. 1963).
17 Glaser v. People, 395 P.2d 461 (Colo. 1964).
18 Id. at 462.
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Whether a plea of guilty can be withdrawn after the sentence
has been imposed is a much debated question. 9 In absence of a statu-
tory provision to the contrary, whether to allow or refuse the with-
drawal after sentence has been imposed lies within the sound discre-
tion of the court."0 In a few states where statutes explicitly permit
withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentence, the statutes are so
construed as to prohibit a withdrawal after sentence has been im-
posed.21 In other states with like statutes, either requiring or per-
mitting withdrawal before imposition of sentence, the above-men-
tioned rule of discretion is followed and is in accord with federal
practice ("to correct manifest injustice")," and with procedure in
a majority of the states. 3 Colorado is in the minority in absolutely
prohibiting the withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentence has been
imposed.
In another 1964 case, the question arose as to who explains to
a defendant the consequences of a plea of guilty. Section 39-7-8 of
the Colorado Revised Statutes2s contains the following language:
"In all cases where the party indicted shall plead guilty, such plea
shall not be entered until the court shall have fully explained to the
accused the consequences of entering such plea...." In this case,
the district attorney, acting under the court's direction, made the
necessary explanation to the accused, and the court accepted the plea
of guilty to the crime of indecent liberties; the supreme court
affirmed the judgment, declaring that the acceptance of the plea
did not violate any of defendant's constitutional rights.2 ' The court
reasoned that the above-mentioned statute does not require the judge
to make the explanation; the obvious meaning is that the rights of
the defendant must be protected pursuant to the court's sound discre-
19E.g., Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888) ; State v. Olson, 115 Minn.
153, 131 N.W. 1084 (1911). Curran v. State, 53 Ore. 154, 99 Pac. 420 (1909) ;
See also, Annot., 99 L. Ed. 217 (1955); 4 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 1909 (1957).
20E.g., Smith v. U.S., 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Sands v. State, 126 So. 2d 741
(Fla. 1961) ; Fair v. Balkcom, 216 Ga. 721, 119 S.E.2d 691 (1961) ; State v. Plum,
14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963) ; Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 126
N.W.2d 625 '(1964).
21 State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261 P.2d 997 (1953) ; State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa
1132, 125 N.W.2d 242 (1963) ; State v. Scott, 101 Wash. 199, 172 Pac. 234 (1918).
2 2 FED. R. Civ. P. 32(d).
2 E.g., Holston v. State, 103 Ga. App. 373, 119 S.E.2d 302 (1961) ; State v. Raponi,
32 Idaho 368, 182 Pac. 855 (1919) ; Clift v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 573, 195
S.W.2d 557 (1937) ; State v. District Court, 81 Mont. 495, 263 Pac. 979 (1928) ;
People v. Longe, 269 App. Div. 474, 57 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1945) ; Gist v. State, 278
P.2d 250 (Okla. 1954).
24 See generally, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 421 (4) (1961).
25 The court refers to the 1953 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-7-8, which is identical in the
1953 and 1963 editions of the statutes.
26
Kephart v. People, 395 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1964).
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tion. In this instance the district attorney warned the accused of the
consequences of pleading guilty, advised him his right to counsel,
explained the nature of the charge, and advised him of his right to
a jury trial. There was no denial of due process."
There have been a number of other Colorado cases interpreting
section 39-7-8, Colorado Revised Statutes, in such a liberal fashion,
but they have dealt with the situations wherein his own counsel has
advised defendant of the consequences of pleading guilty and the
trial court has inquired into the adequacy of counsel's explanation
of defendant's rights.28 The Kephart case of 1964 is the first in
which the statute has been construed so as to allow the district
attorney to make this important explanation.
While the rule is not universal, especially as to misdemeanor
cases, it is generally recognized that when one pleads guilty to a
criminal charge, the court must inform the accused of his rights and
the significance of his decision.29 There are many cases in other
jurisdictions where, under analogous circumstances, the accused had
been held to have been sufficiently advised by the court." Research
has found no case in any jurisdiction prior to Kephart wherein
accused has been advised of his rights by a district attorney.
E. RETRIAL IN A FIRST DEGREE MURDER CASE MUST BE ON THE
ISSUES OF BOTH GUILT AND PUNISHMENT.
In Jones v. People,"' the court held that issues of guilt and
punishment in a first degree murder case must be resolved by the
jury in a unitary fashion. The defendant had two trials. He had
been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in
1960, but that judgment was reversed in 1961 and the case remanded
27 Id. at 9.
28 E.g., Marler v. People, 139 Colo. 23, 336 P.2d 101 (1959) ; Glass v. People, 127
Colo. 210, 255 P.2d 738 (1953).
29
E.g., Rowe v. U.S., 227 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Wis. 1964) Martinez v. People, 152
Colo. 521, 382 P.2d 990 (1963) ; Adams v. State, 224 Md. 141, 167 A.2d 94 (1961)
State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 127 N.W.2d 153 (1964).
30
E.g., People v. Emigh, 174 Cal. App. 2d 392, 344 P.2d 851 (1959); (Defendant
deemed sufficiently informed of rights when represented by court-appointed attor-
ney) ; Gladden v. State, 227 Md. 266, 176 A.2d 219 (1961) (Record discloses that
defendant specifically requested that no counsel be appointed and that judge informed
defendant of his plea) ; Brown v. State, 223 Md. 401, 164 A.2d 722 (1960) (Court
and counsel advised defendant as to his rights and the consequences of his plea);
Jones v. State, 221 Md. 141, 156 A.2d 421 (1959) (Counsel and court fully
explained the consequences of pleading guilty); State v. Wall, 36 N.J. 216, 176
A.2d 8 (1961) (Though technical meaning of non vuh not explained to accused,
consequences of plea were fully explained by counsel and the court); People v.
Serrano, 20 App. Div. 2d 777, 247 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1964) (Plea of guilty to murder
in second degree allowed to stand, though the court, prior to plea, elicited infor-
mation from defendant indicating a killing in the heat of passion.).
31393 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1964).
1965
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
for a new trial because evidence of mitigating circumstances was
denied admission.32 At the subsequent trial the extent of punish-
ment was the sole issue determined by the jury. Upon a sentence of
death, defendant once again appealed. Now the court has declared
that where a sentence of death for first degree murder was reversed
and the case remanded for new trial because the defendant was
erroneously prohibited from introducing evidence of mitigating
cirumstances, a retrial on the issues of both guilt and punishment
was necessary."
In arriving at its decision, the majority pointed out that Section
40-2-1, Colorado Revised Statutes, which defines homicide and its
modes of commission, and Section 40-2-20, which provides that
once the killing has been proved the burden is upon the accused to
prove circumstances of mitigation, have long been construed in
relation to each other.3" The court went further, stating that section
40-2-3, Colorado Revised Statutes, which provides, in part, that a
jury deciding guilt in a first degree murder case shall also fix the
penalty, must be construed in connection with sections 40-2-1 and
40-2-20 and must be a unitary action on the part of one jury.3"
The court said that it was powerless, pursuant to section 40-2-3,
to remand the case only on the issue of punishment; that a judicial
amendment of a legislative act is clearly improper, 36 as also is attribu-
ting to a statute a legislative intent which is inconsistent with the
plain and literal meaning of the statute."
Pringle, J., and Moore, J., dissented," Justice Moore stating in
his opinion that the procedure followed by the lower court in the
second trial was proper due to the fact that no defense to the murder
was presented at either trial and the only issue remaining upon
remand of the case was the extent of the punishment to be pre-
scribed.39 Two factors were most persuasive in guiding the dissenters:
(1) The evidence prohibited in the first trial, which gave rise to
the error, was not presented to the jury in the second trial; (2) a
32Jones v. People, 146 Colo. 40, 360 P.2d 686 (1961).
33 393 P.2d at 368.
34 Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 852 (1886).
35 To the effect that a jury selected pursuant to law which finds a defendant guilty of
murder must also fix the penalty, see, People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 249 Pac. 859
'(1926) (but, if jury silent as to punishment, death penalty inferred) ; Shank v.
People, 79 Colo. 576, 247 Pac. 559 (1926); Demato v. People, 49 Colo. 147, 111
Pac. 703 (1910) ; People v. Hicks, 287 N.Y. 165, 38 N.E.2d 482 (1941).
3
6 Farmers' Irr. Co. v. Kamm, 55 Colo. 440, 135 Pac. 766 (1913).
37 Isaak v. Perry, 118 Colo. 93, 193 P.2d 269 (1948).





Maryland case, Brady v. State,40 wherein the procedure followed by
the trial court upon the second trial was identical with that in the
instant case, the pertinent provisions of a Maryland statute being
the same as Colorado's." Jones presents a stronger case than Brady
for remand on the issue of punishment only, because in the latter
case there was also disagreement as to whether the prohibited evi-
dence went not only to the matter of punishment but even to that of
guilt.
It is not uncommon for states to allow juries, pursuant to con-
stitutional provisions or statutes, to assess the extent of punishment
to be administered in a first degree murder case; however, for lesser
offenses the court usually assesses punishment pursuant to statute, 2
and, as a general rule, when a new trial is ordered before a jury,
the parties are put in the same position as though the case had never
before been heard.4" Jones demonstrates that Colorado adheres to
the general view; the dissent presents the theory that an exception
can reasonably be made when the jury in the first trial has, without
error, passed on the issue of guilt and there remains to be decided
at the second trial only the extent of the punishment to be admin-
istered.
F. ONE CONVICTED OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE CANNOT BE SUB-
JECTED TO BODY EXECUTION IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR THE
SAME WRONG.
Section 77-9-3 of the Colorado Revised Statutes and Rule
101(a) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a
person convicted of a criminal offense cannot be subjected to body
execution in a civil action for the same offense;44 proper construction
of the appropriate passages indicates, however, that acquittal of the
criminal charge prohibits a claim of immunity from body execution."
The defendants in Boyer v. Elkins4 were acquitted of the criminal
40226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), ajj'd, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
41 ANNOT. CODE OF MD. art. 27, § 413 (1957).
42 E.g., People v. Lane, 16 Cal. Rptr. 801, 336 P.2d 57 (1961) ; State v. Maxey, 42
N.J. 62, 198 A.2d 768 (1964); Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523
'(1963) ; State v. Sayward, 63 Wash. 2d 485, 387 P.2d 746 (1963).
43 E.g., State v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931); Hobbs v. State, 231
Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963) ; Duncan v. State, 41 Okl. Cr. 89, 270 Pac. 335
(1928) (Statute which provides that granting a new trial places parties in the same
position as though no trial had been had is constitutional.).
44 COLO. REv. STAT. § 77-9-3 (1963) provides that: "In no case shall an execution
issue against the body of a person when the person shall have been convicted in a
criminal prosecution for the same wrong." COLO. R. Civ. P. 101(a) (1963) states:
"[Iln no case shall such execution issue when the defendant shall have been con-
victed in a criminal prosecution for the same wrong."
45 Boyer v. Elkins, 390 P.2d 460 (Colo. 1964).
46 Ibid.
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charge of assault and battery but were subsequently subjected to
body execution pursuant to civil litigation of the same matter. The
supreme court held that the distinction made between one convicted
of a criminal offense and one acquitted of the criminal offense was
reasonable and did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; there-
fore, body execution could proceed.47
Relying on an earlier Colorado case,48 the court said that the
classification is reasonably related to the lawful purpose of the act,
i.e., that one convicted of a criminal charge should not be required
to suffer a second punishment. In Kennedy v. Simansky,49 the court
would not allow a body execution against one found guilty of assault
and battery in a civil action when, in an earlier criminal prosecution,
he had been merely fined for the same assault.
It is apparent that Colorado is the only state allowing body
executions which has declared that one previously convicted in a
criminal prosecution for the same wrong shall not be subject to
subsequent body execution."0 Various classes of persons have been
held to be exempt from arrest and imprisonment on execution
against the person,5' but it seems that no other jurisdiction would
exempt the judgment debtor who was previously prosecuted in a
criminal action for the same wrong. On the contrary, it would seem
that body executions initiated in a civil proceeding, but subsequent
to criminal prosecution for the same wrong, are commonplace out-
side Colorado. 2
G. THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL SHALL HAVE NO RETROSPECTIVE
AFFECT IN COLORADO. THIS RULING SUBSEQUENTLY RE-
VERSED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
In Arthur v. People,5 3 the court stated that the now-existing
requirement that accused persons shall be advised concerning their
right to counsel and offered assistance of counsel would not be given
47 Id. at 465.
48 Grant v. Gwyn, 148 Colo. 56, 365 P.2d 256 '(1961). In this case defendant was
convicted of a criminal offense and subsequently declared immune from body execu-
tion pursuant to an adverse civil verdict on the same incident.
4975 Colo. 103, 224 Pac. 233 (1924).
SOld.; Grant v. Gwyn, 365 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1961).
51 E.g., Swift v. Chamberlain, 3 Conn. 537 (1821) (electors while going to or re-
turning from the polls); Brazill v. Green, 137 N.E. 346, 243 Mass. 252 (1922)
(officer of the court if engaged in official duties) ; Bush v. Pettibone, 4 N.Y. 300
(1850) (idiots, lunatics or infants); Harrison v. Caudle, 141 S.C. 407, 139 S.E.
842 (1927) (females exempt).
52 See 33 C.J.S. Executions § 4 13c (1942).
53 393 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1964).
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retrospective effect. Defendant was convicted of forcible rape in
1956, and the court, in the present case, felt that failure to advise
accused of right of counsel or failure to offer assistance of counsel
was not a violation of due process pursuant to state or federal law
at the time of the 1956 conviction." Recognizing that the United
States Supreme Court has brought about a change in the law,5 the
court would not believe it was the intention of the Supreme Court
to apply the present law retrospectively." However, in Arthur v.
Colorado,57 a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the
Colorado decision.
In Gideon v. Wainwright,58 the Supreme Court said nothing as
to the retrospectivity of the newly-promulgated rule. The ruling,
however, had been applied retrospectively prior to the Arthur case
in another per curiam opinion by the Supreme Court. 9 Whether to
apply a new ruling retrospectively has always been a difficult ques-
tion for the courts,"0 but there is already abundant commentary to
the effect that Gideon should apply retrospectively.61 It is unfortu-
nate the Supreme Court has chosen to deal with the issue summarily.
H. FORFEITURE OF APPEARANCE BOND USUALLY FINAL IF DEFEND-
ANT APPREHENDED BY THE STATE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE
FROM THE SURETY
One interesting bail case came before the supreme court in 1964,
People v. Johnson."2 The court held that where, after forfeiture of
the appearance bond, the defendant is apprehended by the state
without assistance from the surety, judgment should be entered
54 The leading Colorado case on the subject at that time was Kelley v. People, 120 Colo.
1, 206 P.2d 337 (1949). See also Rules 11(a) and 44 (as amended) of the Colo-
rado Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring that persons accused shall be advised
concerning their right to counsel and offered assistance of counsel if indigent. Such
requirement was nonexistent when the defendant was convicted. See also Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), which the court relied on in deciding the Kelley case,
as authority for the proposition that federal and state due process are not necessarily
identical in comparable cases concerning right of counsel in criminal adjudications.
5 5 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
56 393 P.2d at 375.
5785 Sup. Ct. 943 (1965).
58372 U.S. 335 (1963).
59 Pickelsmer v. Wainwright, 84 Sup. Ct. 80 (1964).
60 E.g., United States v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
61 See concurring opinion of Judge Sobeloff in Jones v. Cunningham, 319 F.2d 1, 4-5
(4th Cir. 1963), arguing that Gideon does apply restrospectively. For a strong
moral and legal argument advocating applying Gideon retrospectively, see Tucker,
The Supreme Court and the Indigent Defendant, 37 So. CAL. L. REV. 151, 177-178
(1964). See generally, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 144 (1964); Showalter, Right to
Counsel- Retroactive Application of Gideon Rule, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 578 (1964).
62 People v. Johnson, 395 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1964).
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against the surety for the penal amount of the bond, unless the court
sees fit to order a lesser amount, under no circumstances to be less
than the costs necessitated by defendant's failure to appear.
The surety is afforded protection pursuant to statute,63 either
before or after forfeiture,64 if he returns the defendant himself.
The court felt the clear intent of the statute was not to afford a surety
such protection, unless the trial court in the exercise of its sound
discretion thought otherwise, when the defendant was apprehended
without the aid of the surety. The court adopted appropriate lan-
guage stated in a New York opinion, People v. Fiannaca,65 to the
effect that sureties, in most cases, would be held strictly liable for the
penal amount of the bond upon the disappearance of their principals.
The New York court in the Fiannaca case based its reasoning on the
earlier case of People v. Schwaize,"6 where it had said: ". . . Justice
may be defeated by the escape of the principal, and, if it is clearly
understood that the bondsman will be held rigidly accountable for
the escape, the administration of the criminal law will be pro-
moted ... "67
In the absence of statutes to the contrary, sureties are generally
not discharged by any event occurring after forefiture of the bond.68
There are, however, instances when relief will be granted (absent
a statute to the contrary) if the default was excusable and the state
has lost no rights against the accused. 9 If the state will allow
remittance after forfeiture, it is usually only when the accused appears
63 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-2-18 (1963) provides:
In all cases of bail for the appearance of any person charged with any criminal
offense, the sureties of such person at any time before judgment is rendered,
upon scire facias to show cause why execution should not issue against such
sureties, may seize and surrender such person to the sheriff of the county
wherein the recognizance shall be taken, and it shall be the duty of such
sheriff, on such surrender and delivery to him of a certified copy of the
recognizance by which such sureties are bound, to take such person into
custody, and by writing acknowledge such surrender, and thereupon the
sureties shall be discharged from any such recognizance, upon payment of all
costs occasioned thereby.
64 Van Gilder v. Denver, 104 Colo. 76, 89 P.2d 529 (1939), where the court held that
a surety on a criminal recognizance may be released from liability thereon by the
surrender of the defendant, even after forfeiture and judgment against him on the
bond, if he acts before final disposition of the case, extending to a review on error.
65 306 N.Y. 513, 119 N.E.2d 363 (1954).
66 168 App. Div. 124, 153 N.Y.S. 111 (1915).
67 1d. at 126.
68 E.g., United States v. Copua, 94 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1938) ; United States v. Russo,
7 F. Supp. 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). But see, Annot., 84 A.L.R. 416, 422 (1933) as
to the inherent power of the court to relieve bail-bondsman from forfeiture of his
bond.
69 See generally, 8 C.J.S, Bail § 92(a) (1962).
VOL. XLII
ONE YEAR REVIEW
on his own volition70 or surrenders through his surety.71 The last-
mentioned contingency is imposed by statute in Colorado.7' The
Johnson opinion, however, indicates that the trial court is allowed
to exercise its sound discretion in the matter. The prevailing view
is that sureties cannot, as a matter of right under the statutes, redeem
themselves by surrendering the principal after forfeiture, and are
not released by the subsequent voluntary appearance of the accused ;73
the court may, however, refuse or grant the remittance, in whole or
in part, pursuant to its discretion.74
I. (1) AUTHORITY OF STATE BOARD OF PAROLE IS NOT LIMITED TO
PERSONS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO PRISON SUBSE-
QUENT TO CREATION OF THE BOARD.
(2) MEANS OF PAROLE DO NOT INCLUDE EXECUTIVE COMMU-
TATION AND RELEASE OF PRISONER TO FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION.
A habeas corpus petition failed because the authority of the
State Board of Parole is not limited merely to persons who have been
convicted and sentenced to prison subsequent to the legislature's
creation of the board.75 The petitioner was convicted and sentenced
prior to the statutory establishment of the Board of Parole. He was
paroled by the board. The subsequent revocation of his parole gave
rise to the habeas corpus proceeding. The supreme court held that
section 39-18-1 of the Colorado Revised Statutes76 (which deals
with parole regulations) was not an ex post facto law. The court
dismissed petitioner's contention that the board could not revoke his
70 General Cas. Co. of America v. State, 229 Ark. 485, 316 S.W.2d 704 (1958);
Edwards v. State, 321 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1958). But see, Van Gilder v. People, 75
Colo. 515, 227 Pac. 386 (1924) (The appearance for trial of the defendant in a
criminal case is not equivalent to a surrender of his person by a surety on his bond.).
71 United States v. Rutherford, 59 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1932) ; Weber v. United States,
32 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1929) ; Southard v. People, 74 Colo. 67, 219 Pac. 218 (1923) ;
State v. Arioso, 207 Iowa 1109, 224 N.W. 56 (1929) ; Bruntlett v. Carroll County,
193 Iowa 875, 188 N.W. 142 (1922); Commonwealth v. Grady, 236 Ky. 98, 32
S.W.2d 720 (1930) ; Speight v. Porter, 2 La. App. 597 (1925) ; State v. Hinojosa,
364 Mo. 1039, 271 S.W.2d 522 (1954).
72 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 39-2-18 (1963). See note 62, supra.
73 United States v. Levine, 1 F. Supp. 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1932) ; Hickey v. State, 150 Ark.
304, 234 S.W. 168 (1921) ; People v. Durbin, 32 Cal. Rptr. 569, 218 Cal. App. 2d
886 (1963); People v. Simon, 244 I11. App. 484 (1927); State v. Shell, 242 Iowa
260, 45 N.W.2d 851 (1950); People v. Continental Cas. Co., 301 N.Y. 79, 92
N.E.2d 898 (1950) ; State v. Jimas, 166 Wash. 356, 7 P.2d 15 (1933).
74 E.g., United Benefit Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1962)
People v. Durbin, 32 Cal. Rptr. 569, 218 Cal. App. 2d 886 (1963) ; State v. Fedrico,
82 N.H. 258, 132 At. 679 (1926). See generally, Annot., 84 A.L.R. 416, 424
(1933).
7 5 Coleman v. Tinsley, 393 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1964).
7 The court refers to the 1953 COLO. REv. STAT.; § 39-18-1 is § 39-18-4 in the 1963
edition of the statutes.
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parole, stating that if the act creating the board was invalid, the
board had no right to grant a petitioner's parole in the first place.
Petitioner could not enjoy the benefits of a parole system and then
disclaim it when he violated its provisions.
Both the Colorado and the United States constitutions prohibit
the passing of ex post facto laws.77 Colorado has interpreted this
prohibition78 in a manner consistent with the leading United States
Supreme Court case, Calder v. Bull." Since Calder, it has been
understood that the interdict against ex post facto laws does not
apply to civil statutes.80 An ex post facto law within the constitu-
tional prohibition must be one which imposes punishment for an
act which was not punishable when it was committed, imposes addi-
tional punishment, or alters the situation of the accused to his
disadvantage. 1
Thus, the key factor in determining whether a statute is an
ex post facto law is whether it works to the disadvantage of the
accused, changing punishment or increasing it beyond that annexed
to the crime when committed. Parole regulations, clearly, were
promulgated for the benefit of those incarcerated in state penal
institutions and not designed to work a hardship on the inmates
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9,10 "No . .. ex post facto law shall be passed." "No State
shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law .. "; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 11. "No
ex post facto law . . . shall be passed by the general assembly."
78 Garvey v. People, 6 Colo. 559, 45 Am. Rep. 531 (1883).
79 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Justice Chase wrote:
I will state what I consider ex post facto laws within the words and the intent
of the prohibition.
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime and makes it greater than it was
when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punish-
ment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the offender.
80 See generally, 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 435-438 (1956).
81 Andrus v. McCauley, 21 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Wash. 1936). See, e.g., Graham v.
Thompson, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957) (An ex post facto law is a law that
changes punishment and inflicts greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed); United States v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Tex.
1957) (This clause precludes retroactive application of any substantive statute that
increases punishment or changes ingredients of offense between time of its commis-
sion and time of trial) ; Barton v. State, 81 Ga. App. 810, 60 S.E.2d 173 (1950)
(The application of a subsequent reduction of the penalty only to cases arising after
the enactment thereof does not raise the question of ex post facto legislation, because
ex post facto law prohibited by this clause refers only to laws which aggravate the
crime, increase the punishment, or allow conviction on a less or different weight of
evidence, and not to those which reduce or modify the penalty) ; Commonwealth
ex rel. Wall v. Smith, 345 Pa. 512, 29 A.2d 912 (1942) (An ex post facto law
within the constitutional prohibition against enactment of ex post facto law is one
which makes a crime of an act which when committed was not a crime or a law
which increases the punishment for an act already committed).
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therein. That a statute applies retrospectively does not necessarily
mean that it is an ex post facto law within the meaning of the state
and federal prohibition.82 In Kolkman v. People,8" the Colorado
court cites with approval Beazell v. Ohio,4 to the effect that the
intent of the prohibition is ". . . to secure substantial personal rights
against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, . . . and not to limit the
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do
not affect matters of substance,...."85
In another case of interest, the district court was held to have
erred in not issuing a writ of habeas corpus and in failing to grant
a hearing to a prisoner who alleged that he was not on parole, but
that his Colorado sentence was commuted by the governor for the
purpose of release to a federal court, and who further alleged that
he had been erroneously ordered by a Colorado supervisor of parole
to report to the parole office in Denver. " The order of release did
not constitute a parole, and at no time did petitioner agree to the
conditions of parole. The inference clearly is that section 39-18-1
of the Colorado Revised Statutes" does not include executive com-
mutation and release to federal jurisdiction as a means of parole
from the state penitentiary.
Gerald IF. Wischmeyer
82 Satterlee v. Mathewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 410 (1829) (Retrospective laws which do
not impair the obligation of contracts or partake of the character of ex post facto
laws are not condemned or forbidden by any part of the Constitution.).
8389 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931).
84269 U.S. 167 (1925).
85 Id. at 171.
8 Espinoza v. Tinsley, 390 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1964).
8rThe court refers to the 1953 CO. REV. STAT.; 39-18-1 is 39-18-4 in the 1963
edition of the statutes.
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IV. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A. (1) FATHER WHO, WITHOUT FAULT, Is DELINQUENT IN CHILD
SUPPORT PAYMENTS, CANNOT BE DENIED VISITATION
RIGHTS AS PUNISHMENT FOR DEFAULT.
(2) TRIAL COURT MAY ORDER PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF
PARTIES IN A DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASE THOUGH COLO.
R. CIV. P. 35(a) DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY SO PROVIDE.
The court's decision in Kane v. Kane1 involved holdings on
several different points, two of which are of significance. The first
involves enforcement of an order to pay child support. A father had
been ordered to pay $460.00 per month child support, and he had
asked for a stay of execution of that order on the grounds that his
net income was only $500.00 per month. The wife had asked that
the father be denied visitation rights until he became current in his
child support payments. The supreme court granted the stay of
execution and ordered interim payments of $200.00 per month pend-
ing resolution of the issue. Then, citing no authority, the court
held that a husband cannot be punished by denying him visitation
rights until he becomes current in his payments. Colorado thus
joins a number of other jurisdictions wherein this rule has been
expressed.2
The general philosophy underlying such a rule is usually said
to be that children are entitled to the love and companionship of
both their parents, insofar as that is possible and consistent with
their welfare; a parent whose child is placed in the custody of another
person has a right of visitation with the child at reasonable times
It is only where the best interests of the child' indicate otherwise that
the father should be denied the right of visitation.' Thus visitation
rights and duty to pay support may be said to be independent of
1 391 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1964).
2E.g., Fitch v. Fitch, 207 Iowa 1193, 224 N.W. 503 (1929); Gibford v. Gibford,
55 Wash. 2d 760, 350 P.2d 158 (1960) ; Block v. Block, 15 Wis. 2d 291, 112
NW.2d 923 (1961). Cf. Weiner v. Weiner, 149 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
Contra, Barbour v. Barbour, 134 Mont. 317, 330 P.2d 1093 (1958) (accompanied
by a strong dissent in favor of the rule adopted by Colorado).
3 See generally 2 NELSON, DIVORCE § 15.26 (1961).
'Searle v. Searle, 115 Colo. 266, 272, 172 P.2d 837, 840 (1946), cites with approval
this definition from Brock v. Brock, 123 Wash. 450, 212 Pac. 550, 551 (1923):
In determining what is best for the welfare of the child of tender years, the
court must consider not only the food, clothing, shelter, care, education and
environment, but also must bear in mind that every such child is entitled to
the love, nurture, advice and training of both mother and father, and to deny
the child an opportunity to know, associate with, love and be loved by either
parent, may be a more serious ill than to refuse it in some part those things
which money can buy.
5 Grosso v. Grosso, 149 Colo. 183, 368 P.2d 561 (1962); Strakosch v. Benwell, 135
Colo. 317, 310 P.2d 720 (1957); Fitch v. Fitch, 207 Iowa 1193, 224 N.W. 503
(1929) ; Syas v. Syas, 105 Neb. 533, 34 N.W.2d 884 (1948).
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each other,' with the welfare of the child the paramount considera-
tion at all times.7 Careful note should be taken, however, of the
limiting words "through no fault of his own"8 which the court used
in connection with the husband who is delinquent in support pay-
ments. The limiting words probably mean that before applying this
rule a court should require a husband to show that his delinquency
resulted from a bona fide financial inability to pay and not from
mere negligence or stubbornness or any other improper motive. Of
course, orders restricting or modifying the right of visitation are
within the discretion of the court.'
Compliance with orders of a court respecting alimony and sup-
port may be enforced by contempt proceedings"° and may include
imprisonment." Because contempt proceedings are elastic, other
remedies may be available where support money has not been paid,
but denial of visitation should not be so used. The best reasoning
behind not restricting visitation rights as a punishment for non-
support is found in the principal case.
We can conceive of no greater cause for disharmony in human
or family relationships than the application of such vindictive rules.
And, we can conceive of nothing more apt to make a father stub-
born to the point of contempt of abandonment than this applica-
tion.
12
The Kane opinion also produced the court's clearest statement
confirming a trial court's power to order psychiatric examination
of parties in a domestic relations case, though such an examination
is not, said the court, specifically provided for in Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure 35 (a)."3 It is true that the rule does not specific-
ally provide that such an examination can be ordered in a domestic
relations case, but it expresses no limitation as to the type of action
to which it may be applied;" nor must the mental condition be
directly in controversy in order to employ its provisions." The pre-
vailing view, in line with a philosophy of liberal construction of the
61n re Dublin, 201 Wis. 621, 112 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1952).
7 Lear v. Lear, 29 Wash. 692, 189 P.2d 237 (1948).
8 Kane v. Kane, 391 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. 1964).
9 Hayes v. Hayes, 134 Colo. 315, 303 P.2d 238 (1956); Bird v. Bird, 132 Colo. 116,
285 P.2d 816 (1955); Miller v. Miller, 129 Colo. 462, 271 P.2d 411 (1954);
Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Colo. 74, 234 P.2d 903 (1951) ; Emerson v. Emerson,
117 Coo. 384, 188 P.2d 252 (1947).
10 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 43-1-12 (1963).
11 Harvey v. Harvey, 384 P.2d 265 (Colo. 1963).
12Kane v. Kane, 391 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. 1964).
3 CoLo. R. Civ. P. 35(a) provides: "In an action in which the mental or physical
condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may
order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician."
144 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 35.03, at 2557 (1963).
' Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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Rules, is that there is no limitation on the type of action in which the
rule may be available."
In a 1951 case, Richardson v. Richardson," the Colorado
Supreme Court declared that a trial court had authority to require
the husband in a divorce proceeding to submit to a mental exami-
nation. In Nelson v. Grissom,8 the divorced father contested the
remarried mother's petition to remove the children from the state,
on the ground that the step-father, due to emotional instability, was
unfit to share custody of the children. Since the step-father was out
of the state, a mental examination was not ordered for him, but
the court implied that such an examination could properly have been
ordered had he been within the jurisdiction, 9 holding that hospital
records pertaining to the step-father's previously conducted psychi-
atric examination at Colorado Psychopathic Hospital were admis-
sible, if otherwise competent and not privileged, as bearing on the
step-father's parental fitness."
The court's correct and liberal interpretation of Rule 35(a) in
Kane should serve as a reminder to Colorado attorneys that the rule
is available in other than personal injury cases.
B. (1) HUSBAND MAY NOT BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY ON His LIFE, FOR WIFE'S BENEFIT,
AS PART OF ALIMONY AWARD.
(2) COURT'S ORDER DIVIDING PROPERTY CANNOT REQUIRE
THAT PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY HUSBAND AFTER DIVORCE
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT BE SHARED WITH DIVORCED
WIFE.
Two important issues were passed on in Menor v. Menor2'-
the first dealt with whether the husband could be ordered to main-
tain an insurance policy on his own life and the second involved
the problem of how to divide property which existed in the form
of corporate stock. The Colorado Supreme Court disapproved orders
of the trial court in both instances.
In the division of property the husband had been ordered to
keep in full force and effect, for his wife's benefit, a $150,000
18 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 821.1, at 478
(1961).
17 124 Colo. 240, 236 P.2d 121 (1951).
18 152 Colo. 502, 382 P.2d 991 (1963).
19 The court said, at 152 Colo. 504, "Evidence as to [the step-father's] emotional
stability, or lack of it, was certainly material to this issue, even though he was not
a party to this litigation." (Emphasis added.)
20 152 Colo. at 504.
21 391 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1964).
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executive protection life insurance policy naming her as sole bene-
ficiary. The general rule is that a court does not have the authority
to order involuntary maintenance of an insurance policy to pay
future alimony.' Alimony is terminated by remarriage of the ex-
wife," or the death of the ex-wife or ex-husband, 4 though attempts
have often been made to have alimony continue after the death of
the ex-husband through voluntary stipulations as to life insurance.
If the parties have reached such an agreement by contract, and the
contract is incorporated in the divorce decree, its terms may be
enforced after the death of either party."5 Absent this situation,
alimony stops with the death of the ex-husband and he cannot be
forced to provide for payments after his death through maintenance
of a life insurance policy. However, if the policy has a cash sur-
render value at the time of the divorce, this value may be taken into
consideration in a division of property by the court."8 The court
seems to have characterized the trial court's action with respect to
the insurance policy purely as an award incident to alimony. Had
the court characterized the insurance as aiding in support of the
children, would a different result have been reached?
Presumably, part of the proceeds from the insurance policy on
the father's life would benefit his three children even though the
sole named beneficiary of the policy was the mother of the children.
As a general rule in Colorado a father's duty to support his children
terminates on the emancipation of the child,27 or the father's death,28
and courts are without power, in rendering support orders, to have
the father establish an estate payable to his children upon his death. "
One recent case3" upheld an order forcing maintenance of an insur-
2See 2 NELSON, DIVORCE § 14.60 (1961).
2 See COLO. REv. STAT. 46-1-5 (1963) which states that: "[Tjhe remarriage of the
former wife shall relieve the former husband from further payment of alimony to
her... ."
24
Doll v. Doll, 140 Colo. 546, 345 P.2d 173 (1959) ; Elmer v. Elmer, 132 Colo. 57,
285 P.2d 601 (1955); International Trust Co. v. Liebhart, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P.2d
264 (1943).
25
Magarrell v. Magarrell, 144 Colo. 228, 355 P.2d 946 (1960); In re Yoss' Estate,
237 Iowa 1092, 24 N.W.2d 399 (1946); Flicker v. Chenitz, 55 N.J. Super. 273,
150 A.2d 688, (1959), where the court stated:
"It has been generally held that while the obligation to pay alimony in its
technical sense ordinarily terminates upon the death of the husband, yet if he
expressly undertakes to pay a stipulated sum . . . and the agreement is
approved by the court . . . the provision is enforceable against the estate of
the former husband upon his death."
26 2 NELSON, DIVORCE § 14, at 126 (1961).
27Taylor v. Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 362 P.2d 1027 (1961).
2Doll v. Doll, 140 Colo. 546, 345 P.2d 723 (1959).
2Miller v. Miller, 52 Cal. App. 2d 443, 126 P.2d 357 (1942) ; Elmer v. Elmer, 132
Colo. 57, 285 P.2d 601 (1955); Brown v. Brown, 131 Colo. 467, 283 P.2d 951
(1955); Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1961) ; Rex v. Rex, 331 Mich. 399,
49 N.W.2d 348 (1951) ; Mahaffey v. First Nat'l Bank, 231 Miss. 798, 97 So. 2d
756 (1957) ; Kunc v. Kunc, 186 Okla. 297, 97 P.2d 771 (1939).
30 Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1961).
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ance policy on the theory that it was to be security for the payment
of a support order. This case has been strongly criticized however.'
The husband owned fifty percent of the stock in a corporation,
from which he derived his income. The trial court ordered that
present rights in the stock not be disturbed, but that in the event of
dissolution of the corporation or sale of the shares, twenty-five
per cent of the proceeds from such sale go to the wife and three
children and be divided among them equally. The husband objected
to awarding the wife an interest in the proceeds of a future possible
sale or dissolution of his corporate assets on the ground that this
would be an award of the future estate of the father.
Property settlements are based upon the situation of the parties
at the time of the decree"2 and are forever binding on the parties."
It is necessary to distinguish alimony from property settlement
because alimony, by its very nature, must be derived from a future
estate and property division must mean to divide property held at
the time of division.'4 Courts have a continuing jurisdiction over
alimony,"5 which may be increased, decreased, or terminated."6 The
purpose of alimony is to provide support for the former spouse
during the uncertain years following the divorce.
In the Meno-r case the order of the trial court as to the shares
of stock would have had effect only after the decree of divorce.
It could thus not have been a division of property for it would not
reflect the situation at the time of the divorce.37 Nor was it alimony
by its very terms. Such an award based on future disposition of the
stock would in no way reflect a division of the property as of the
date of divorce, since the stock might subsequently appreciate or
depreciate in value. The court ordered the value of the stock on the
date of the divorce decree ascertained, such valuation properly being
the subject of a division of property.
Stanley Lopata
31 Ibid. (dissenting opinion) ; 36 TUL. L. REv. 367 (1962).
" Stephenson v. Stephenson, 134 Colo. 96, 299 P.2d 1095 (1956); Brown v. Brown,
131 Colo. 467, 283 P.2d 951 (1955) ; Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d
363 (1947) ; Gourley v. Gourley, 101 Colo. 430, 73 P.2d 1375 (1937).
33 Magarrell v. Magarrell, 144 Colo. 228, 355 P.2d 946 (1960); Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117
Colo. 296, 186 P.2d 583 (1947) ; Low v. Low, 79 Colo. 408, 246 Pac. 266 (1926).
34 See cases cited note 33 supra.
35 Harris v. Harris, 113 Colo. 41, 154 P.2d 617 (1944); Stevens v. Stevens, 31 Colo.
188, 72 Pac. 1061 (1903).
36 Elmer v. Elmer, 132 Colo. 57, 285 P.2d 601 (1955), wherein the court held that,
"It is fundamental that alimony is subject to modification due to the changed circum-
stances of the parties, such as marriage, death .. "
37 Brief of Plaintiff in Error, pp. 16-19, Menor v. Menor, 391 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1964).
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